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1 Introduction
The development of software for dependable systems on which the safety or
security of individuals, organizations, and property may rely has become an im-
portant application and research ﬁeld. In many cases, law enforces certiﬁcation
as a prerequisite for the introduction of a technical, dependable system. The
certiﬁcation formally assures that the systems and its development process meet
the technical standards and all eﬀorts have been made to reduce the risks. The
complexity and discrete nature of software makes an assurance of the required
properties of the software components of a dependable system extremely dif-
ﬁcult. This applies even more as the software often constitutes the control in
a so-called embedded system where coupling electronic and mechanical compo-
nents is still a challenge. The relevant national and international standards (e.g.
IEC 61508 [Int00]) recommend formal methods for the development of systems
that shall be certiﬁed for the higher safety integrity levels. However, deriving
constructive design guidelines and formally veriﬁable software constraints from
safety requirements on the system level is still a challenging problem.
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In many industries developing high-assurance products, model-based design
is already well established and a number of tools used in safety-critical soft-
ware design are founded on formal semantics and support in parts automated
code generation, formal analysis, veriﬁcation or error detection. But certiﬁca-
tion requires more than formal semantics of a modelling notation or the formal
veriﬁcation of the artefacts of a particular development step. Formal methods
and tools have to be embedded in a seamless design process which covers all
development phases and which includes an eﬃcient construction of a safety case
for the product. Moreover, whereas most (semi-)formal modelling approaches fo-
cus on functional issues additional concepts are required for dependable systems
like fault tolerance, timing or security. Even if these concepts are addressed 
as several UML proﬁles do  they are supported at most rudimentarily by the
tools.
1.1 Some Statistics
The workshop aimed at bringing together people actually working on the certiﬁ-
cation of dependable systems with researchers who develop and validate (semi-)
formal methods and tools for modelling and veriﬁcation. About 30 researchers
and practitioners followed the invitation. The program featured about 25 pre-
sentations, 14 research presentations from academia, 4 reports on experiences
in the certiﬁcation processes of particular products and 6 about practical issues
from industrial participants. In addition, a discussion session on the status quo
of formal methods in the certiﬁcation of dependable systems was arranged.
1.2 The Railway Level Crossing Case Study
To focus discussions and to directly compare diﬀerent approaches a case study
on the design of the software control for a simple railway level crossing [HHLZ07]
was given to the participants beforehand. Several participants addressed the case
study in their presentation. So it was shown that some immediate shortcomings
in the requirement speciﬁcation could be detected with simple static analysis
techniques applied on an abstract design model. This observation was indepen-
dent of formal modelling notations actually used. A more subtle ambiguity was
detected by those approaches that employed formal veriﬁcation on a behavioural
model of the level crossing. Another participant used a generalized version of the
case study to prove scalability of a veriﬁcation approach. Last but not least, the
case study has set up the discussion to what extend implicit assumptions are
revealed when transferring an informal requirements speciﬁcation into a formal
model and how to deal with diﬀerent categories of implicit assumptions method-
ologically.
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2 Discussion on the Status Quo of Formal Methods and
Certiﬁcation of Dependable Systems
On each of the issues raised during the discussion, there was a wide spectrum
of partly divergent opinions and observations. A summary of each of the main
themes follows below.
2.1 Mathematical Rigour
On the one hand, it was reported, that all necessary techniques were available
to treat the subject satisfactorily. By a relevant number of pilot projects it has
been proven that systems of impressive size can be veriﬁed working with theorem
proving or model checking on the basis of a cleanly and well deﬁned semantics
for systems and problem statements. A decomposition into well-built layers, each
veriﬁed itself, and dedicated construction of relations between layers, was consid-
ered to be a successful approach. This goes very well with the model-based design
paradigm, because most model-based development processes provide modelling
guidelines for diﬀerent levels of abstraction. The proponents of a rigorous formal
approach were convinced that even the popular counter-arguments - as ongoing
problems with scalability of formal veriﬁcation, the high investments needed to
develop the initial foundation of a formal process (e.g. veriﬁed layers), and the
severe shortage of experts who have profound knowledge on formal methods and
the application domain - would merely be surmountable obstacles.
This positive view was not shared by everybody. First of all, a number of
participants considered the mentioned obstacles to be substantial. Additionally,
the maturity of formal methods and tools was challenged: So far, a relevant
portion of the success stories was achieved with prototype tools in a research
environment. These are not easily transferred into the ﬁelds of practice, not only
because matters like tool support, robustness and scalability, and domain speciﬁc
adaptations have to be solved for industrial development. The most important
barrier for introducing academic tools in dependable system industries is that
certiﬁcation imposes high requirements not only on the products and the process
but also on each tool used in the development and in particular for quality
assurance.
2.2 Veriﬁcation and Validation Tools
There was a general agreement that tool support for veriﬁcation and validation
(V&V)is indispensable and will grow in its importance in the following years.
There were of course, again, diﬀering viewpoints.
One observation concerned the introduction of new analysis methods like
hybrid model checking into the ﬁeld of (control) engineering. Up to now, these
model checkers have not yet shown much promise to be able to handle even
medium size designs. Are, henceforth, the "classical" engineering techniques in
this ﬁeld going to be replaced in the foreseeable future? And how are they, then,
going to be integrated with formal speciﬁcations and reasoning?
4 M. Huhn, H. Hungar, D. Peled
A similar integration concern has been raised with respect to the growing
usage of automatic simulation or test generation tools. Though considerable
progress has been made in automation techniques, it is diﬃcult to proﬁt from
a tool which does not guarantee complete coverage. Related to this issue is the
question of how to ﬁnd the "interesting" points via simulation or testing? Hence,
these techniques have to be equipped with means to direct the search to those
parts of the state space where complex and error-prone behaviour occurs, i.e.
interactions between components from diﬀerent suppliers, or mode transitions in
the presence of exceptional behaviour. Moreover, the technique should be able
to identify dead code or unreachable parts of the state space or other anomalies
indicating potential errors.
To summarize, it shows more promising to speciﬁcally tailor a tool to a
particular purpose explicitly required by regulations than (naively) introducing
an unspeciﬁc test generation tool into the V&V process. For example the avionics
standard DO-178B requires MC/DC coverage, which can be addressed by a
dedicated procedure relying on abstract interpretation.
If requirements are not that strict, as for instance it is often the case in
the automotive domain, it is somewhat easier to proﬁt from the availability of
high-level models. This argument gets detailed in the section on processes.
2.3 Speciﬁcation
The question of whether speciﬁcation has to be formal is controversial. Clearly,
formality helps to uncover errors and to avoid misinterpretation, and eases subse-
quent automation and application of formal techniques. Additionally, the ubiq-
uitous UML [Obj05] carries the promise of an emerging de-facto standard of
becoming a lingua franca, understood across domains.
There are obvious objections concerning the communicability of formalisms
and the diﬃculty of checking consistency and completeness. These are more se-
vere deﬁciencies in a formal than in an informal speciﬁcation, since the latter
appeals more to the developer's experience and competence. Also, it was said
that speciﬁcation is "inherently an iterative process", where some aspects can-
not be ﬁxed before at least a prototypical exploration of the design is applied.
That speciﬁcation cannot be ﬁxed up front is experienced even in cases where
standards require this explicitly, like the EN 50128 [CEN01]. Often, customers
require late changes to a product. To incorporate such changes into a speciﬁca-
tion is usually more diﬃcult when the speciﬁcation is formal.
Finally, UML is not naturally suited for every kind of application: Parts of the
UML are not unambiguously deﬁned, others presume a particular model of exe-
cution as for instance statecharts [HK04] with event pools and run-to-completion
semantics, that does not match the semantic world of every application. For mod-
elling the hardware architecture appropriately, which is an integral part of most
design and analysis tasks in dependable system development, the UML adoption
SysML [Obj07] plus proﬁles like MARTE [Obj06] are needed.
There was wide agreement that there is no one language for formal speci-
ﬁcation, nor could there be one. Application-speciﬁc languages certainly have
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their place, as well as weak formalisms like the UML for communication pur-
poses. Whether one should strive for full formality depends at least today on the
means available and on the requirements.
2.4 Process
The speciﬁcation is only one of the artefacts to be produced in a design process.
The seminar's focus was on dependability and safety, so their role was promi-
nently discussed. In several domains standards prescribe a process skeleton; and
a number of well established industrial processes for developing dependable and
certiﬁable systems instantiate and reﬁne these skeletons.
Typically, certiﬁcation and thus development processes for dependable sys-
tems necessitates construction of an argument of safety in a formalised document
 a so-called safety case. It is considered advisable to take speciﬁc care so that
the safety case construction can be done hand-in-hand with the development,
i.e. integrate safety arguments with speciﬁcation reﬁnement and implementa-
tion. Today, this is not yet done satisfactorily eﬃcient. Improvements will most
likely be possible on a basis of formal development artefacts. Some safety con-
cerns give rise to additional functional requirements, e.g., when redundancy or
watchdog constructs are introduced as safety measures. Here, a tight integra-
tion of the design steps and the construction of the safety case is particularly
recommended.
Another issue is the structure in the line of arguments in the safety case itself.
Approaches like Goal Structuring Notation [Kel98] improve the conciseness and
understandability of reasoning. Moreover, context information and constraints,
limiting the applicability of a particular argument or reasoning method, can be
made explicit. However, full integration with model-based design methods or
formal V&V methods is missing so far.
In the automotive area, a domain-speciﬁc standard for the development of
safety related electronic programmable systems is still pending (e.g. ISO WD
26262). Here, the development of automotive systems is performed according
to an iterative, approximative process. First a core control model is developed
on the basis of an ideal plant model. In the next step the normal behaviour of
the control model is explored and validated in the real plant. Then exceptional
behaviour and speciﬁc case treatment is added to the control model. Then a ﬁne-
tuning and optimization phase follows. Finally, the control model is transformed
into target speciﬁc code, which is validated against the runs of the ideal model.
In all phases, design proceeds based on the division of labour between OEM and
suppliers.
3 Conclusion
It was commonly agreed that formal speciﬁcation has already reached the stage
of being an eﬀective support in the development of software-intensive dependable
systems and that its role will increase in the future.
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Technical progress in veriﬁcation, for instance in component-oriented rea-
soning (assume-guarantee proofs) and (semi-)automated abstraction techniques,
signiﬁcantly expand the potential for applying formal methods on complex sys-
tems.
A tighter integration of models for design and models for veriﬁcation has al-
ready begun and proven to be a key factor for the introduction of formal methods
into the industrial practice. A number of veriﬁcation approaches directly start
with design models from UML or Matlab/Simulink as analysis input and oﬀer
seamless tool integration. However, these methods are often restricted to one
particular veriﬁcation goal that is considered relevant in one design phase or to
a single concern like functional correctness or timing. Thus, a major challenge
for the future will be to integrate formal approaches dealing with the diﬀerent
concerns that contribute to safety like functional correctness, reliability, timing,
et cetera.
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